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DELIVERABLE 9.1

Analysis report: Context & background of the European Security Model





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Analysis report: Context & background of the European Security Model

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1 Introduction

1.1 The Cutting Crime Impact project

Cutting Crime Impact (CCI; www.cuttingcrimeimpact.eu) is a 3-year project (starting 1 October 2018) funded by the European Commission's Horizon 2020 Programme.

One of the objectives of the CCI project is to enable Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and relevant security policymakers to adopt a preventative, evidence-based and sustainable approach to tackling high-impact petty crime¹, through development and implementation of Tools tailored to their needs. CCI also aims to encourage wider EU adoption of effective approaches to safety and security, and will develop an extended European Security Model that includes high-impact petty crime and citizens' feelings of insecurity.

Tackling crime and reducing feelings of insecurity is recognised by the EU as priorities for citizens:

"A European Internal Security Strategy (ISS) must be built on the basis of evidence and analysis of the security interest of the people of Europe as well as the added value and effects of new security policies."

Carrera and Guild, 2011²

This CCI deliverable explores the ideas and historical context of the 'European Security Model' concept. We will start with its earliest mention in internal EU documents, and follow its path through the various generations of security policy and strategy documents from the early years of the 21st Century.

We note that the EU 2010 publication on the *Internal Security Strategy (ISS)* is subtitled: '*Towards a European Security Model*'. This suggests that the elusive European Security Model may not, in fact, yet exist. The original challenge of the CCI work package to which this report contributes was to "...expand and revise the European Security Model to include petty crime and feelings of insecurity".

If, as the 2010 report subtitle suggests, the European Security Model does not yet exist, then we will explore the principles that might govern the content of such a Model.

¹ The term '*high impact petty crime*' is commonly used in EU documents and refers to types of crime such as burglary, assault, robbery, theft, pickpocketing and vandalism. In terms of volume, this is the largest crime type facing EU citizens daily. These crimes have a significant negative impact on European citizens' quality of life, and society in general. Consequently, the word 'petty' used in this context does not mean 'insignificant' or 'inconsequential'.

² Carrera, S. and Guild, E. (2011) "The EU's Internal Security Strategy and the Stockholm Programme: A challenge to the Rule of Law and Liberty in Europe?", *Freedom, security and Justice*, pp. 198–204.

1.2 Objectives

The objectives of CCI work package 9 that relate to Task 9.1 are³:

- To investigate how the European Security Model might be expanded to integrate high-impact petty crime and associated feelings of insecurity, and propose a revised model that achieves this
- To understand the background and context of the European Security Model, which is promoted within the EU's Internal Security Strategy⁴
- To understand how the European Security Model guides practices and policies relevant to LEAs and security policymakers.

1.3 Methodology

As part of CCI Task 9.1, desk research was conducted with the aim to understand:

1. The historical background and conceptual basis of the European Security Model
2. Ethical, legal and social aspects of the European Security Model
3. How the European Security Model currently influences the work of LEAs and policymakers.

Desk research was supplemented with 17 semi-structured interviews with relevant LEAs, EU policymakers and research project coordinators to address gaps in knowledge. Interviewees included:

1. EU-level institutional representatives potentially involved in the development of the European Security Model
2. EU-level agencies potentially involved in the delivery of the European Security model
3. Coordinators and key partners in such research projects that may have informed the European Security Model
4. Experts in European security.

³ CCI Grant Agreement. These two objectives were presented in a different order originally. There are three more objectives following these two main objectives: (i) To understand how the European Security Model guides practices and policies relevant to LEAs and security policy makers; (ii) To develop a clear and accessible conceptual framework /explanatory model that integrates high-impact petty crime and associated feelings of insecurity within the European Security Model; and (iii) To develop communication tools and recommendations for key stakeholders (including EU policymakers and LEAs) to support communication of the extended EU Security Model, and its use by key stakeholders to inform policy and practice.

⁴ (i) The 2010 Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a European security model; (ii) The 2017 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions. Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces (Brussels, 18.10.2017 COM (2017) 612 final); and (iii) The 2020 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions (on the EU Security Union Strategy).

2 Literature review: Historical context for a European Security Model

This section discusses the documented events identified as being contingent to a European Security Model, including:

- Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (1997)
- Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (1999)
- European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003)
- The Hague Programme (2005)
- Internal Security Strategy (2010)

The documents also highlighted other features relevant to a European Security Model, including:

- COSI standing committee
- EMPACT platform (2012/13)

These items are discussed in chronological order in the following sections.

2.1 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (1997)

An early reference to a *European Security Model* emerged in 1997. In this year, the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (CSCE), established in 1975, took the decision to change its name to the *Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe* (OSCE), becoming the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organisation with observer status at the United Nations. A second decision taken by the now-OSCE at their 1997 meeting was to start discussions on a "*Security Model for the 21st Century*".⁵

It is proposed that the new Security Model should "in some way embody" all international organisations active in the field of European security, under the leadership of the OSCE—rather than through establishment of new structures (Schneider, 1998, p.243).

⁵ Schneider, H. (1998) "*The European Security Model for the 21st Century – A Story without an Ending?*" In IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 1997, Baden-Baden 1998*, pp. 235–255 (available [here](#)).

While the OSCE was considering the 'international security' aspect — rather than the everyday security on which CCI is focused — it is worth noting Schneider's (1998) interesting conclusions as to the use of the term 'model':

"In contrast to terms such as 'security organisation', 'security system', 'security order', etc., the expression 'security model' carries a feeling of distance between it and any notion of binding obligations or of anything that ought necessarily to be. On the other hand, in sociology the concept of a model is used in the sense of a simplified reconstruction of reality as it is, without any prescriptive sense, so that a "security model" could also be understood as a simplified depiction of existing arrangements, i.e. of the structural and inter-institutional status quo."

Schneider, 1998, p. 240

2.2 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council (1999)

The Amsterdam Treaty set new objectives for justice and home affairs in the EU covering: policing, customs, legal cooperation, visas, immigration and asylum. This was followed by the "Action Plan establishing an area of freedom, security and justice", a detailed programme for the Council and Commission adopted at the December 1998 regular European Council in Vienna — some Council documents refer to this as the "Vienna Plan" (Statewatch, 2003. Available [here](#)).

The review of EU documents that include content that might be considered relevant to a European Security Approach begins with the European Council summit in Tampere, Finland in October 1999 (see [here](#)). This special EU Summit meeting was used to establish the so-called "Area of freedom, security and justice" as one of the primary objectives of the EU.

Taking advantage of the changes included in the Amsterdam Treaty, approved two years earlier, the European Council lay the foundation for the creation of what is called an 'Area of freedom, security and justice':

"The European Council is determined to develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice by making full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam"

Tampere, 1999, Introduction

It is the first official document that expressly mentions that the European Union should create a security area, directly linked to the values of freedom, human rights, democracy and justice:

"From its very beginning, European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law. These common values have proved necessary for securing peace and developing prosperity in the European Union. They will also serve as a cornerstone for the enlarging Union."

Tampere, 1999, Towards a Union of freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones

One of the underpinning concepts in the Tampere document is that security is founded on principles of justice and fair treatment of all citizens—not only for the Union’s own citizens, but also for third states’ citizens.

However, the Tampere conclusions are dominated by the need for fighting illegal immigration and "excessive" asylum seekers and the establishment of agencies, bodies or toolkits to foster cooperation in the field of policing and justice. For example, the document mentions the joint investigation teams, Eurojust and CEPOL. Most of the types of crime mentioned in the document relate to serious and organised crime — with no reference to everyday or 'petty' crimes.

Part C of the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere Summit, entitled "A Unionwide Fight Against Crime", references the European Council's deep commitment to:

"...reinforcing the fight against serious organised and transnational crime. The high level of safety in the area of freedom, security and justice presupposes an efficient and comprehensive approach in the fight against all forms of crime."

Staying in Part C, in section VIII, entitled "Preventing crime at the level of the Union" the European Council endorses the importance of crime prevention, calling for:

"... the integration of crime prevention aspects into actions against crime as well as for the further development of national crime prevention programmes. Common priorities should be developed and identified in crime prevention in the external and internal policy of the Union and be taken into account when preparing new legislation."

Tampere, 1999, Part C, section VIII, point 41

The next point in the section calls for increased exchange and networking between crime prevention practitioners, stating:

"The exchange of best practices should be developed, the network of competent national authorities for crime prevention and co-operation between national crime prevention organisations should be strengthened and the possibility of a community-funded programme should be explored for these purposes."

Ibid., point 42

We could deduce that the Tampere European Council suggested a humanistic approach to security — *"a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law"*.

While Tampere suggests *"the first priorities"* sharing and exchange of crime prevention could be *"juvenile, urban and drug-related crime"*, the focus remains on *"the fight against serious organised crime"* and *"cross-border crime"*. There is little room for the crimes that most influence citizens’ lives and forms the bulk of the crime burden: everyday, potentially high-impact crimes like burglaries, assaults, robberies, theft, violence, harassment and vandalism. Also, citizens’ feelings of insecurity (often referred to as fear of crime) are not mentioned.

However, the Tampere summit explicitly underlined the importance of crime prevention, suggesting that Europol “...has a key role in supporting unionwide crime prevention, analyses and investigation.” This focus for law enforcement on crime prevention is timely — if not arguably a little late. As early as the 1980s, concepts such as ‘multi-agency approach’, ‘partnerships’ (involving local authorities, municipalities, police and citizens) had become a cornerstone in most national crime prevention approaches.⁶

2.3 European Security Strategy (2003)

In 2003 a *European Security Strategy* (ESS, 2003) was drawn up under the authority of the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. Entitled “*A Secure Europe in a Better World* (European Security Strategy)⁷. The opening sentence of the first chapter (page 4) makes a distinction between external and internal security of the Union, yet also inextricably links the two by stating: “*The post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.*” The European Security Strategy states that:

“*Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable*” and it goes on to list five key threats:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Regional Conflicts
- State failure
- Organised Crime.⁸

The ESS has a clear focus on external global security and concludes by declaring⁹:

⁶ Tampere identifies the need for “...a network of competent national authorities for crime prevention and co-operation between national crime prevention organisations”. This paves the way for the Brussels-based European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) (see <https://eucpn.org/>). The EUCPN aims to connect practitioners at the local, national and European level and to promote crime prevention knowledge and practices among the EU Member States. The EUCPN was set up in 2001 by Council Decision (2001/427/JHA), which was replaced in 2009 (2009/902/JHA).

⁷ Brussels, 8 December 2003, 15895/03, PESC 787

⁸ “Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states.” Dijk, Jan van, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Jacqueline Joudo Larsen (March 2021) “Global Crime Patterns: An Analysis of Survey Data from 166 Countries Around the World, 2006–2019”, *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 20 March, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-021-09501-0>

⁹ “*Building Security in our Neighbourhood*” (page 9). In this document the term ‘Neighbourhood’ refers to the Balkan wars, Arab countries and Russia, not to a city neighbourhood.

“An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.”

It is notable that the ESS refers to the fact that “internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.”

In the context of the CCI project, it should be noted that the ESS primarily addresses areas where increased cooperation between Member States might be necessary (or even inevitable) to tackle the root cause of the identified threats.

2.4 The Hague Programme (2005)

The Hague Programme (2005), see [here](#), is the successor of the Tampere agreement and was designed with the same idea: to be the foundation of the construction of the new freedom, security and justice area in the following five years. It builds on and ‘develops’ the same criteria and principles as were identified by Tampere: fundamental human rights should be the priority, but the main threats continue to be migration and asylum, external borders, terrorism, organised crime and the need to establish a true EU area of justice with shared responsibilities. Also highlighted by the Hague Programme is the importance of migrant integration to keep peace and security and an emphasis on information systems and information exchange in order to be able to guarantee security.

Between 2005 and 2009 several operational instruments of cooperation (among which the European Arrest Warrant) were created. The terrorist attacks in Madrid, London and other European cities facilitated the development of common norms in the area of terrorism, justice and common operational actions.

Crime prevention is briefly mentioned in the Hague Programme, and is seen as:

“...An indispensable part of the work to create an area of freedom, security and justice. The Union therefore needs an effective tool to support the efforts of Member States in preventing crime. To that end, the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) should be professionalised and strengthened. Since the scope of prevention is very wide, it is essential to focus on measures and priorities that are most beneficial to Member States. The European Crime Prevention Network should provide expertise and knowledge to the Council and the Commission in developing effective crime prevention policies.”

The Hague programme, C53/10

Under "2.5. Operational cooperation", the Hague programme also states that:

“Coordination of operational activities by law enforcement agencies and other agencies in all parts of the area of freedom, security and justice, and monitoring of the strategic priorities set by the Council, must be ensured. To that end, the Council is invited to prepare for the setting up of the Committee on Internal Security.”

The Hague programme, C53/10

2.5 Lisbon treaty (2009)

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. With this, the EU gained the authority to establish measures to promote and support Member States' actions in crime prevention:

"The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to promote and support the action of Member States in the field of crime prevention, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States."

Lisbon Treaty (2007/C 306/01) Art. 69 C, 2007)

The Lisbon treaty (2009) resulted in the formal establishment of the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) in 2012. These two groups are discussed in sections 2.5 and 2.6, below.

2.6 COSI standing committee

The Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) was established in 2010. The main purpose of COSI is to facilitate, promote and strengthen the coordination of EU countries' operational actions related to the EU's internal security.^{10,11} It is involved in diverse areas that deal with freedom, security and justice, such as police and customs co-operation, law enforcement, border control and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. COSI also evaluates the general directions and efficiency of operational cooperation, as well as assists the Council of the EU in matters such as how to respond to terrorist attacks, man-made or natural disasters.¹ It appears that over the years, COSI has become very influential in the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.¹²

COSI is composed of high-level members from each EU member state's Ministry of Interior and/or Justice as well as the European Commission and European External Action Services (EEAS) representatives.¹⁰ COSI is assisted by the permanent representatives to the European Union of the EU countries in Brussel and by the secretariat of the Council of the EU.¹³ In addition, interested parties that may attend the meetings as observers include: Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, and CEPOL. Europol and Frontex have apparently been "...the main interlocutors of COSI, second to CEPOL and Eurojust".¹²

¹⁰ See: Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) - Consilium

¹¹ See: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:en:PDF> (Article 71).

¹² Tereszkiewicz, F. (2016) *"The role of COSI in the European Union's internal security area: The initial years of activity"*. Retrieved May 10, 2021, available [here](#)

¹³ See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/internal_security_committee.html

COSI was first said to be excluded from the process of preparing legislative acts. They are not involved in any operational proceedings that are still the task of the member states. However, as COSI is said to be “...responsible for evaluating the general direction and efficiency of operational cooperation with the goal to identify possible shortcomings and adopt recommendations to address them”, it will necessarily have an influence on the Council’s policy priorities and those of national policing. Hence, COSI has at least an indirect influence on legislation regarding internal security.

COSI’s duties are not only related to legal acts, but also to the main political acts of the EU. For instance, within the Stockholm Programme, it is stated that one of COSI’s priorities should be the development, monitoring, and implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, as well as to cover security aspects of an integrated border management and judicial cooperation in criminal matters relevant to operational cooperation in the field of internal security. Furthermore, the document entitled “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe from 2010” (available [here](#)) references the major role that COSI has played in promoting and strengthening operational cooperation within the European Union. The COSI Standing Committee facilitated coordination of the actions of relevant authorities of the member states and, together with the Political and Security Committee, helped:

“...to ensure consistency with the wider European security strategy and to exploit synergies between internal and external policies, including risk and threat assessments”.

The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe. 2010, p.15

A final example of duties and tasks that COSI has undertaken is its central role in the EU Policy Cycle for serious and coordinated crime and their increasing involvement with Home Affairs agencies with regard to operational activities. Indeed, it is said that COSI has become:

“...The main “clearinghouse” for policy development, decision-making, policy implementation and evaluation, with the EU Home Affairs agencies as the critical feeders of knowledge, evidence and expertise into the EU Policy Cycle.”

In summary, COSI’s priorities can be grouped into two categories:¹⁴

1. **Organisational matters** – the EU Policy Cycle, the Internal Security Strategy/the European Agenda on Security 2015-2020, the EU strategy for combatting radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, the coordination mechanism for joint operations, the financing of operational cooperation agencies, and the interactions between internal and external security
2. **Topical matters** – organised crime, drugs and arms trafficking, the control of external borders and migration control, the refugee’s crisis, terrorism, the discussion of solidarity clause.

¹⁴ See the paper Tereszkiwicz, F. (2016) “The role of COSI in the European Union’s internal security area: the initial years of activity” for a more detailed table of some of COSI’s activities in the period of 2010–2015. Available [here](#).

The COSI operational activities include, for instance, prevention work, training, investigations related to the crimes listed above, or possibly new crime phenomena occurring in EU countries. COSI facilitates and coordinates these actions between/within EU member states and makes sure that activities related to EU Internal Security objectives are being aligned. Prioritising an increase in cooperation and alignment between EU member states does not only relate to operational activities but also to relevant financial considerations (investment of money and resources).

In terms of members, COSI is described as comprising “...bureaucrats from European capitals, that have support from Brussels for its work. It is comprised of high-level officials from each member state’s interior ministry or ministry of justice, and representatives of the European Commission and European External Action Services (EEAS).”

2.7 EMPACT platform

EMPACT — the *European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats* — is a multidisciplinary, intelligence-led and evidence-based EU initiative that aims to tackle the main crime threats facing the EU. Through EMPACT, crime priorities within the current EU policy cycle are addressed and handled in the fight against serious and organised crime. EU member states, agencies and other actors work closely together within the EMPACT framework to address ten crime priorities. For the period 2022–25, the EU priorities are¹⁵:

1. High-risk criminal networks
2. Cyber-attacks
3. Trafficking in human beings
4. Child sexual exploitation
5. Migrant smuggling
6. Drug trafficking
7. Fraud, economic and financial crimes
8. Organised property crime
9. Environmental crime
10. Firearms trafficking.

Established 2012–13, EMPACT has completed two four-year cycles. In March 2021, the Council adopted conclusions on the permanent continuation of EMPACT as a key instrument for operational cooperation to fight organised and serious international crime. EMPACT will continue to follow a four-year cycle, beginning with an assessment of criminal threats and the adoption of the EU crime

¹⁵ Fight against organised crime: Council sets out 10 priorities for the next 4 years - Consilium

priorities. For each of these priorities, annual operational action plans are then developed, implemented and monitored. At the end of the four-year cycle, an independent evaluation is carried out to assess actions and outcomes — the findings from which feed into the following cycle.

Clearly, EMPACT is acting as an agenda-setting mechanism for European security priorities. As such, the outputs of EMPACT might inform or structure a conceptual model of European Security.

In the next section, the Internal Security Strategy is discussed—in which the concept of a European Security Model is again raised.

2.8 The Internal Security Strategy (2010)

In 2010, the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) for the European Union ("*Towards a European Security Model*") was published, see [link](#). Referring to the 2003 text on the external aspect of Europe's security, the 2010 strategy document aimed to "...complement... the European security strategy". Referring to the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm programme, the strategy aimed to enable the EU "...to take ambitious and concerted steps in developing Europe as an area of justice, freedom and security."

As well as setting out the common threats and challenges, the Internal Security Strategy aimed to define:

"... a European security model, consisting of common tools and a commitment to: a mutually reinforced relationship between security, freedom and privacy; cooperation and solidarity between Member States; involvement of all the EU's institutions; addressing the causes of insecurity, not just the effects; enhancing prevention and anticipation; involvement, as far as they are concerned, of all sectors which have a role to play in protection — political, economic and social; and a greater interdependence between internal and external security."

ISS, p. 12.

The scope of the concept of 'security covered by the ISS was broad, with the following 'significant common threats' were identified:

- Terrorism
- Serious and organised crime
- Cybercrime
- Cross-border crime, such as petty or property crime, often carried out by gangs, when it has a significant impact on the daily lives of people in Europe
- Violence itself, such as youth violence or hooligan violence at sports events
- Natural and man-made disasters.
- Other common phenomena:

"...which cause concern and pose safety and security threats to people across Europe, for example road traffic accidents, which take the lives of tens of thousands of European citizens every year."

ISS, p. 13

While petty crime is mentioned in the context of "cross-border crime", the focus is still very much on serious and transnational crimes. However, the ISS does also mention prevention, anticipation of problems and adopting a proactive approach to high impact crime and petty crime.

The ISS goes beyond previous strategies and treaties in increasingly addressing identified threats and issues within Member States. It addresses serious crime, violence and common phenomena which cause concern and pose safety and security threats to people across Europe. However, as Bossong and Rhinard (2013, page 50) state, the focus of the mandate is increasingly broad and unfocused:

"In terms of content, the ISS sets out the widest possible mandate and lists nearly all conceivable threats and challenges for the EU."¹⁶

Bossong & Rhinard (2013) p. 50

On page 19, the ISS reveals the main aim to be a more integrated approach and discusses the role of a 'security model' within this:

"The time has come to harness and develop common tools and policies to tackle common threats and risks using a more integrated approach: that is the main aim of the internal security strategy. To achieve that aim we have chosen a security model which integrates action on law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border management and civil protection."

ISS (2010), p. 19.

A number of principles and guidelines for action in using this model were set out. These are given in the box, below.

Principles

People in Europe expect to live in security and to enjoy their freedoms: security is in itself a basic right. The values and principles established in the Treaties of the Union and set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights have inspired the EU's internal security strategy:

- Justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing whilst respecting fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and privacy;

¹⁶ Bossong, R. & Rhinard, M. (2013) "The EU Internal Security Strategy Towards a More Coherent Approach to EU Security?" In: *STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 2013*. LXVI-2 pp. 45–58.

- Protection of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable, with the focus on victims of crimes such as trafficking in human beings or gender violence, including victims of terrorism who also need special attention, support and social recognition;
- Transparency and accountability in security policies, so that they can be easily understood by citizens, and take account of their concerns and opinions;
- Dialogue as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles of tolerance, respect and freedom of expression;
- Integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination as key elements for EU internal security;
- Solidarity between Member States in the face of challenges which cannot be met by Member States acting alone or where concerted action is to the benefit of the EU as a whole;
- Mutual trust as a key principle for successful cooperation.

Source: ISS (2010) p.9–10.

The Internal Security Strategy is to date the most comprehensive embodiment of an EU security strategy. It includes an integrated approach of actions within law enforcement, judicial cooperation, border management, and civil protection. The ISS provides a set of principles and guidelines to implement these actions. While the Internal Security Strategy does not claim to be a model, it claims to be 'working towards a European Security Model'. The aims of the Internal Security Strategy are extensive, but it is not prescriptive in how nation states should operationalise the principles it provides. This is a strength rather than a weakness, as it recognises the nature of Europe as a partnership of sovereign nation states — each with its own history of, for example, policing and crime prevention. For some, however, this 'European realism' makes the ISS a challenge to 'sell' as a security approach — in a domain where prescriptive guidelines and standards are the norm.

On the subjects of "*prevention and anticipation*" and adopting "*proactive, intelligence-led approach*", the ISS states: on page 22 (etc.):

"Among the main objectives of the internal security strategy for the EU are the prevention and anticipation of crime as well as of natural and man-made disasters, and the mitigation of their potential impact. Whilst effective prosecution of the perpetrators of a crime remains essential, a stronger focus on the prevention of criminal acts and terrorist attacks before they take place can help reduce the consequent human or psychological damage, which is often irreparable.

Our strategy must therefore emphasise prevention and anticipation, which is based on a proactive and intelligence-led approach as well as procuring the evidence required for prosecution.”

Internal Security Strategy, p. 22

The ISS goes on to highlight the importance of understanding and addressing the “*root causes*” of crime. This necessitates a ‘transdisciplinary’ approach be taken to security, involving not only law enforcement agencies, but working in collaboration with other agencies and organisations.

“Prevention of crime means addressing the root causes and not just the criminal acts and their consequences. Security policies, especially those of prevention, must take a broad approach, involving not only law-enforcement agencies but also institutions and professionals at both national and local levels.

Cooperation should therefore be sought with other sectors like schools, universities and other educational institutions, in order to prevent young people from turning to crime. The private sector, especially when it is involved in financial activities, can contribute to the development and effective implementation of mechanisms to prevent fraudulent activities or money laundering. Civil society organisations can also play a role in running public awareness campaigns.”

Internal Security Strategy, p. 22

Towards a — what was it now?

So what was the fate of the European Security Model towards which the Internal Security Strategy was working? Bossong and Rhinard (2013, page 51) are rather critical of the European Security Model indicated within the Internal Security Strategy:

“While containing some degree of symbolic import regarding the intriguing idea of a European Security Model, that model had little substance and could hardly denote a new strategic identity for the EU.”

Bossong and Rhinard, 2013, p. 51.

Bossong and Rhinard suggest that “...to date the symbolic or practical benefits of the ISS have been limited...”, stating that security policymakers’ “... hopes for a mutual vision, guiding principles, and practical coherence in this growing but disparate field must wait for another day.” (ibid. p. 55).

We should note that Bossong and Rhinard's somewhat negative conclusions were drawn in 2013, and there have been many developments since the ISS was first published. However, it does appear that the ambition to elaborate a full model for European security was never realised.

An important focus shift within the European Security domain has been an increased emphasis on fundamental rights and “*the protection of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable, with the focus on victims of crimes.*” (ibid. p. 19). This spotlights the main end-user of European security — European citizens. This aligns with the human-centred approach adopted by the CCI project. As Carrera and

Guild (2011) suggest, “A European Internal Security Strategy (ISS) must be built on the basis of evidence and analysis of the security interest of the people of Europe as well as the added value and effects of new security policies.” (p. 5).

2.9 The European Agenda on Security (2015)

The European Commission adopted *The European Agenda on Security* (see [here](#)) on 28 April 2015. This document set out how the European Union can bring added value to support Member States in addressing security threats over the period 2015–20.

The document begins by emphasising the need for compliance with human rights and the need for security policy and practice to be transparent, accountable and democratic. In this respect The European Agenda on Security echoes priorities and principles outlined in the Internal Security Strategy some five years previously. The need for internal and external cooperation in fighting crime is clearly expressed, with the importance of information and intelligence exchange, anticipating problems, effective planning and prevention also emphasised.

The three main security priorities defined in The European Agenda on Security are: terrorism, serious and organised transnational crime, and cybercrime. The priorities recognise the need to address social problems associated with such threats. For instance, in the case of terrorism, the need to combat radicalisation, polarisation and discrimination, and to promote youth participation and intercultural and interfaith dialogue. To help achieve this aim, the Commission announced the setting up of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence.¹⁷

2.10 The EU Security Union Strategy (2020)¹⁸

The EU Security Union Strategy is a consolidation of previous documents dealing with European security. It places human rights and so-called ‘European values’ at its heart. Values such as the rule of law, equality, transparency, accountability and democratic control are mentioned as an instrumental means of giving “policies the right foundation of trust” (p.1). The pantheon of principles paraded here are recognisable, to a greater or lesser extent, from previous European security documents.

The link between security and defence is once again made explicit and the protection of EU borders is also present in this document. However, the European ‘obsession’ with asylum seekers and migrants and the ‘other’ is not as prominent in this document as it is in previous ones. The main difference is the extreme prominence given to cybersecurity and cybercrime, which is positioned as almost the main threat for the future. The document proposes the creation of a joint cyber unit and a European Cybersecurity strategy, with the digital world featured strongly within the document. The protection

¹⁷ See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en

¹⁸ EU Commission (2020) “Communication from the Commission on the EU Security Union Strategy” Brussels, 24.7.2020 COM(2020) 605 final (available [here](#)).

of citizens' digital lives is a clear focus for European security policy. On this theme, digitally enabled crimes such as identity are highlighted, while the role of artificial intelligence and other technological resources in improving EU security is emphasised.

The 2020 strategy maintains terrorism as a relevant risk to be addressed, and radicalisation as an associated issue to combat because of the polarisation and resulting social tension it causes. The link from radicalisation to terrorism to defence is evident. Organised crime, still a priority, is identified as an international problem that can similarly destabilise states.

The 2020 EU Security Union Strategy also references the involvement of other actors (public and private) in the creation of security. It states explicitly that the private sector has capability to address digital and non-digital threats, and so should be more involved in security delivery.

"Cooperation with the private sector is also key, all the more so given that industry owns an important part of the digital and non-digital infrastructure central to fighting crime and terrorism effectively."

Ibid. p. 6

On the relationship between security, safety, society and democracy, the 2020 Strategy is clear:

"...We can leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens. Security is not only the basis for personal safety, it also protects fundamental rights and provides the foundation for confidence and dynamism in our economy, our society and our democracy."

Introduction, p.1

The fundamental rights of the citizen have become central to European security.

2.11 Portugal (2021)

Portugal acceded to the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union between 1 January and 30 June 2021, succeeding Germany and preceding Slovenia. The priorities and guidelines for the Portuguese Presidency were detailed in a published programme¹⁹:

"Police and judicial cooperation is a key component of the area of freedom, security and justice in the Union, which needs to be further developed. Due to new criminal phenomena, notably in cyberspace²⁰, and the impact of COVID-19, we need to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement authorities and judicial systems to identify threats and

¹⁹ Programme for the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2021 (available here)

²⁰ See also the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2020 (available here). Every year Europol's European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) publishes the IOCTA. This is a strategic report on key findings and emerging threats and developments in cybercrime — threats that impact governments, businesses and citizens in the EU. The IOCTA provides key recommendations to law enforcement, policy makers and regulators to allow them to respond to cybercrime in an effective and concerted manner.

mitigate their effects, especially on the most vulnerable. In this context, the Presidency will monitor the initiatives arising from the new Security Union Strategy and give priority to the development of the new internal security strategy for the EU, based on prevention and the protection of citizens and their rights, freedoms and guarantees.”

Programme for the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2021, p.15 (emphasis added)

In addition, the programme promises that the Presidency will *“pay attention to community policing and promoting public security”* (ibid, p. 15).

In chapter three, we will discuss the case for including consideration of petty crime within a European Security Model.

3 Literature results: The case for petty crime

3.1 The everyday security of European citizens

The 2010 Internal Security Strategy (ISS) 2010 identified, among other crime types, "serious and organised crime" as well as "cross-border crime, such as petty or property crime" as being "significant common threats". These are clearly serious problems with multi-billion euro revenues that, one way or another, will negatively impact each EU citizen.

Recent research²¹ suggests that organised crime victimises not just the citizen, but society itself, "As the criminal proceeds generated from the trafficking of illegal goods and services are laundered through legitimate businesses, these criminal groups present a risk to both the EU economy and its society".

This perspective of the 'risk to society' from crime brings us back to the citizen perspective. As Carrera and Guild (2011) suggest: "A European Internal Security Strategy (ISS) must be built on the basis of evidence and analysis of the security interest of the people of Europe as well as the added value and effects of new security policies." So what is the interest of the people of Europe?

The security interests of Europeans, and the threats to these, might be evidenced through victim surveys. Such surveys (including those by the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), national surveys, and those by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2014 and 2021) reveal the EU citizen experience of 'everyday' violent crimes, such as assaults²², threats, harassment or sexual violence, as well as property crimes, such as theft, property damage or robbery.

Such 'everyday' crimes are often termed (mistakenly, in the authors' opinion) 'petty crime'.

In 2021 the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) presented the results from their *Fundamental Rights Survey*²³ — the first EU-wide survey to collect comparable data on European citizens' experience of, concerns about, and responses to certain crime types. The survey focuses on

²¹ Hulme, S., Disley, E. and Blondes, E.L. (Eds.) (March 2021). *Mapping the risk of serious and organised crime infiltrating legitimate businesses: Final Report*. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate Migration and Home Affairs (available [here](#) and [here](#)).

²² From 2015, these crimes have been allocated codes in the worldwide UN classification: "The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)". In 2017, a European version of the ICCS was published by Eurostat as a "common framework" to enable European-wide comparison of crime incidence (EU-ICCS, 2017/7). Available [here](#). See also Appendix 1.

²³ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2021) *Crime, Safety and Victims' Rights*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021.

violence and harassment, as well as certain property crimes, and reached 35,000 people in the EU, the United Kingdom and North Macedonia. For details of the 2021 FRA Survey results see [Appendix 3](#).

It is notable that the FRA survey report references the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:

“Violence is a clear violation of victims’ rights, in particular their human dignity and their right to integrity (Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).”

FRA, 2021, p. 18

This links victimisation with human rights and dignity, positioning such everyday crime within an ethical, legal and social dimension. The FRA report goes on to state:

“...Becoming a victim of crime — in particular, violent crime — undermines core human and fundamental rights. It is an extreme manifestation of violation of one’s rights, which can encompass the right to life and human dignity in the context of violent crime...”

Ibid., p. 2

The extent and nature of 'everyday' crime problems in the EU are significant. The 2021 FRA survey revealed the impact of violence on European Citizens:

“The results of this survey powerfully indicate the extent to which people in the EU are exposed to physical violence. Overall, 6 % of people in the EU experience physical violence in a year, some 22 million people (an estimate based on the results of the survey relative to the EU’s population). The findings also document the pervasive impact of physical violence through the victims’ injuries and psychological consequences.”

Ibid., p. 113

Using the experimental Crime Cost Calculator (e-CCC) model developed by Soomeren and Wever (2005), the approximate financial value of this crime can be estimated²⁴. So if we estimate the tangible and intangible impact costs of physical violence at €10,000 per case, then using the FRA survey results quoted above, the approximate annual financial impact of such crimes would amount to some €220 billion. The impact of property crimes might add another 75 billion²⁵, giving a total of some €300 billion damage each year.

It is worth noting that this is almost double the estimated annual revenues of the nine main criminal markets for organised crime in Europe, which researchers propose range from €92 to €188 billion (Hulme *et al*, 2021). While only an estimate, this suggests that large numbers of 'everyday' (or 'petty')

²⁴ Based on an EU study done for EUCPN: Soomeren, P. van and Wever, J, (2005) *Review of Costs and Benefits Analysis in Crime Prevention Report to the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security (Contract JAI/B/1/2003/05a)*. Available [here](#).

²⁵ A 3% victimisation risk for burglary at a cost of about €5,000 a case 75 billion.

criminal offences do indeed result in significant harm — at least equal to the organised crime aspect of internal security.

Like aggregated drops of rain on a large boulder, these everyday crimes have the potential over time to be quite corrosive and, potentially, transformative. As such, they need to be effectively addressed.

Beyond actual crime victimisation, there is also the issue of feelings of insecurity — often mis-categorised (in the authors' opinion) as 'fear of crime'. Feelings of insecurity are informed objective reality, but also have a strong subjective element. As a result, its consequences are very real, including in relation to the way it impacts citizens' behaviour — for example, in attempting to avoid situations they consider 'risky':

"...This can be an effective tactic to avoid victimisation and can result in a lower rate of victimisation if used by many. However, [this] ...can mean that people limit their activities and are not able to enjoy and participate in public spaces as much as others. Avoidance can also exert a toll, for example in extra time spent in taking a safer route or the psychological burden of being on the lookout for danger."

FRA, 2021, p. 106

The report shows that all citizens — but particularly women — frequently avoid places they perceive as risky. Results suggest that around half of EU citizens avoid, at least sometimes, certain streets or areas, or places where there are no people around, for fear of being assaulted or threatened. The survey illustrated the gender difference in such behaviours, showing:

"...Notable differences by gender. Women avoid [particular] situations more commonly than men. Whereas 64 % of women avoid deserted places at least sometimes, only 36% of men consider it necessary to do so."

Ibid., p. 106.

The significant consequences for citizens resulting from 'everyday' crimes and feelings of insecurity — as well as the avoidance behaviours they trigger — indicate their adverse relationship with citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms.

The impact of such crimes would appear to contravene the *European Urban Charter* and *The European Declaration of Urban Rights*, which states:²⁶

*"... Citizens of European towns have a right to:
SECURITY – to a secure and safe town, free, as far as possible, from crime, delinquency and aggression..."*

Council of Europe, 2009.

²⁶ *European Urban Charter*, adopted by the Council of Europe's Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) on 18 March 1992.

And this reminds us also of the EU Charter Fundamental Rights — specifically Article 6:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”

And Article 17:

“Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions...”

So at this level, crime becomes as it were 'political', with regard to the impact on the citizen. Making so-called 'petty' everyday crimes potentially extremely corrosive of the social contract. Hence, while perhaps not so headline-grabbing as terrorism or organised crime, everyday crime is of substantial consequence both in terms of its cost and societal impact.

3.2 The prevention of everyday, 'petty' crime

A number of EU organisations have been established to uphold human rights and freedoms and improve quality of life by preventing crime and mitigating its impact on citizens and wider society. At the pan-European level, one of these is the *European Crime Prevention Network* (EUCPN).

The EUCPN has adopted a broad definition of crime prevention, as follows:

“Ethically acceptable and evidence-based activities aimed at reducing the risk of crime occurring and its harmful consequences with the ultimate goal of working towards the improvement of the quality of life and safety of individuals, groups and communities.”

EUCPN website, *“Crime prevention – a European definition”*²⁷

The EUCPN acknowledges that crime reduction and crime prevention approaches should be proportionate and ethically acceptable. They also use the term ‘evidence-based’, in that interventions should have been shown to be effective — or at least ‘promising’.

An evidence base implies the use of scientific method — in research, analysis, evaluation and assessment. This may involve project-based or locally focused research, but equally an evidence base may be developed through wider benchmarking and meta evaluation of multiple interventions of the same type on a European- or even world-wide scale. Such an evidence base fosters the wider uptake of good practice in crime prevention across Europe.

Crime prevention is not just the role of Law Enforcement Agencies but requires the support and input of other stakeholders in security, such as municipalities, residents, local businesses and other social support agencies. The prevention of everyday crime — a task of significant import addressing multiple causal factors — requires a collaborative and transdisciplinary action.

²⁷ See [here](#) for the definition, but also for the supporting documents.

4 Interview research

4.1 Interview research methodology

As part of this research, several CCI consortium partners²⁸ conducted semi-structured interviews with four distinct groups of experts:

- **Group A:** Originators / developers of the European Security Model
- **Group B:** Developers of Horizon 2020 funding calls referencing the European Security Model
- **Group C:** Users (and potential users) of the European Security Model
- **Group D:** Contextual and / or policy experts.

For each interviewee group a specific question route was developed. Standard interview protocols were provided to all researchers so that they could follow the relevant question route for the specific group to which an interview subject belonged.

Interviews were conducted by telephone or video conferencing (Zoom, Teams or Skype), with a total of 16 interviews being conducted between May and June 2021. In addition, a focus with two participants was conducted in June 2021. The results of the interviews are presented in this chapter.

4.2 Ethical protocol

Instructions and compliance with relevant research ethics good practice included the following:

1. Interviewees were provided with a project information sheet in advance of the interview, including relevant information such as the purpose of the interview, the duration, the form of participation (via telephone, video conferencing platform or face-to-face), the potential role of the interviewee, confidentiality, data processing, as well as contact details of the interviewer.
2. Interviewees were all asked to sign an *Informed Consent Form*, which had to be completed and sent back before the interview took place.
3. To ensure interviewee anonymity, CCI researchers disguised the interviewees' identities by replacing their name with a specific number that referred to the ABCD question route of the interviewee's group. In line with GDPR rules, this list was stored in a secured directory not connected to the (now pseudonymised) interview transcripts.

²⁸ The CCI partners that conducted interviews were Efus, DPT, RUG, INT, USAL and DSP.

5 Interview research results

A structured interview route was provided to CCI partners undertaking this research. In this section we provide the interview results by question, including illustrative quotes where appropriate.

5.1 Have you heard of the European Security Model? If so, what do you think it is?

Summary of responses

8 interviewees stated that they had heard of the European Security Model and 8 interviewees that they had not heard of the European Security Model. Of the latter, 4 were aware of other EU Security Strategies or Initiatives, with one of these volunteering their opinion that there should be a European Security Model.

- 8 interviewees said that they had heard of the European Security Model.
 - 3 of these interviewees stated that it was never (or had not yet been) developed into an actual model or strategy.

“Yes, I’ve heard of the European Security Model. The idea for a model was mentioned in some publications in 2010 — but it was never developed into a real model or strategy.”

Interviewee C1.5
 - 1 interviewee that had heard of the European Security Model understood it to be more abstract: a foundation for defining a common concept of security.
 - 1 interviewee that had heard of the European Security Model was not quite clear what it included or entailed.
 - 2 interviewees that had heard of the European Security Model, but could not provide any further information regarding what it is.
 - 1 interviewee that had heard of the European Security Model, and considered it to be a concept paper written by the European Commission rather than the Council *“to gain relevance in the security area”*. This interviewee believed that the Commission used the term ‘model’ in order to introduce the ‘European security’ concept in a way that had more weight than *“merely”* publishing a paper containing a few ideas. (D2.23)

“My interpretation of this is that this is indeed a question of [the Commission] gaining influence vis-à-vis the member states’ governments that — despite the Lisbon rules —

do not want to relinquish their influence on decision-making in the areas of domestic and judicial policy.”

Interviewee D2.23

“My interpretation is that the ‘model’ is a vehicle to make this intent more palpable. But in my opinion, it isn’t more than that. This program is called a ‘strategy’ and not ‘program’, which is interesting because the earlier programs coming from the Council such as the Tampere Program, the Hague Program and then the Stockholm Program, were all called ‘programs’. But in the past years, this ‘program’ concept and the whole format disappeared and has been discontinued. [...] And what used to be done by the member states in the Council is now done by the Commission because it also wants to be a player in the realm of security. This would be the political science-interpretation of what is happening there right now: the member states do not want to give up power and the Commission has to come up with a few things to be important in this area [...]. Then you call it a strategy because it sounds as if you were acting strategically. The model then pretends it is something so great that everyone should adopt it.”

Interviewee D2.23

- 4 interviewees had not heard of the European Security Model or the term specifically but were aware of other EU Security Strategies or initiatives.

“The European Security Model seems to be outdated, as a concept and as a model.”

Interviewee C1.7

- 4 interviewees had not heard of the European Security Model.

“...It's not a concept that I've heard before or that has guided any sort of decision making.”

Interviewee D1.2

- 1 interviewee, however, believed there was or is a European Security Model
- 1 interviewee did not think there should be one, on the basis that EU Member States are very different countries, with very different values, very diverse sense of justice, different Police services, different approach to prevention, different levels of resources, etc. (D2.24)

5.2 Do you think it is / would be useful to have a European Security Model? If YES: How would it be useful, do you think?

Summary of responses

A total of 11 interviewees thought a European Security Model would be useful to have, in that it could provide a common approach to security and petty crime, integrate feelings of insecurity and promote empirical research and its use in policy making. 4 interviewees did not think there was a need for a European Security Model, as they felt that there was already an Internal Security Strategy and other documents addressing crime in the EU.

- 11 interviewees thought it would be useful to have a European Security Model

“Yes, a European Security Model could promote... empirical research in the field of cross-border organised crime and promote the use of the results of this empirical research in crime prevention policymaking.”

Interviewee C1.9

“...Especially if you want to tackle cross border international crime, you need a common approach. Otherwise any country is doing his own approach — and you will need a common approach... So, we need something in common — to share information; to share best practices; and to share prevention methods, and so on. So, from my point of view, it is very, very useful to have a model on a European level.”

Interviewee C1.10

“It is also about commitment (German: “Verbindlichkeit”) to which we can align our national strategies. [...] Especially in case of states wanting to join the EU you need these kinds of strategy frames to show them where the journey is going to go, what the focal points for action are and how things are defined. [...] It provides orientation and is also a demand paper that tells them: ‘Here are the big goals of the larger community of the Union’.”

Interviewee C2.12

“We do not have a common model within the EU, but that is a function of how the Union is structured: Primary responsibility for internal security rests and remains with the member states due to the Principle of Subsidiarity. The EU provides complementary structures, agencies and support that the member states can and do use to increase cooperation and build trust and create synergies. However, due to changing crime patterns and threat landscapes, the EU has enormously grown in relevance on this point over the past ten years, because many questions relevant for the member states can no longer be answered on a national level. The Internal Strategy documents on the EU level

help formulate specific goals and objectives relevant to the member states and thus move them from the strategic to the operational level, to encourage cooperation and synergies, and to strengthen the trust between member states. These goals are “in part informed by political demands and in part by the methodologically more sound work of experts such as Europol and other agencies.”

Interviewee C2.13

“Yes, of course it would be useful to have a common approach to European security. We already have something like this for terrorism and organized crime with the EMPACT cycle that develops strategies for the future based on information management and analysis. [...] Petty crime has been strongly neglected in those terms. So we need a common approach based on common methods, harmonising them and identifying best practices. Because a good idea isn’t worth much if it is only applied locally or regionally. [...] A common approach would have the power of the factual.” “Such a model does not have to be a legally binding EU directive or regulation or national law, but it can be very useful as a guideline.”

Interviewee C2.14

- It would be useful to integrate prevention and feelings of insecurity into Security Strategies across Europe.
- 1 interviewee highlighted it would be useful to have to encourage innovation on a technological, scientific and organisation level and allow for sharing of best practice across the EU. However the fact there are significant differences between countries in terms of legality, proportionality and accountability needs to be considered: one size does not fit all.

“Probably, yes, it would be useful to spell this out in more detail for several different purposes. But too much under one umbrella terms is also not useful, do not push it too far.”

Interviewee D1.19

- One interviewee did not specify how it would be useful, but that the EU, due to its position should be involved in (the creation of) a European Security Model, but questioned whether it should be a model or a strategy.
- One interviewee suggested that a European Security Model would be useful to unify the common perspective member states have on security, stating:

“The European Security Model should be a social model. It should aim at a peaceful society, with a high level of welfare. A society with sufficient public goods will normally deliver a good policing model.”

Interviewee D1.22

- Two interviewees did not provide further information on how precisely a European Security Model would be useful.

- 4 interviewees did not think it would be useful to have a European Security Model

“With each change of Commission, there are different strategy documents or existing documents are revised and terms are then partly exchanged.”

Interviewee C1.7

“No, there is already the internal security strategy and there are several models for the combat against crime in the EU.”

Interviewee C1.5

5.3 Who do you think the users of a European Security Model might be?

The following potential users of a European Security Model were identified by the interviewees:

- EU policymakers
- Security practitioners / policymakers on a national level
- Security practitioners / policymakers on a local level
- Law enforcement agencies (LEAs)
- Universities and polytechnics
- Consultancy firms
- Border guard
- Intelligence agencies.

5.4 Do you think there exists a common understanding of security issues among European security practitioners? If YES: What do you think is included within this common understanding?

Summary of responses

8 interviewees thought a common understanding of security issues exists, whereas 5 thought it did not — with 1 stating that it depended on the type of crime. Responses indicated some consensus between EU member states on more broadly defined, international security issues like drugs, organised crime, terrorism and human trafficking. However, there appear to be great conceptual and procedural differences regarding security issues at the more national or local level.

- 8 interviewees reported that a common understanding of security issues exists among European security practitioners
 - One interviewee agreed that there appeared to be a practical consensus, but that it is not based on a common terminology/concept. Terminology differences between different languages were identified as a challenge – for example, the distinction between the terms “safety” and “security” does not exist in German. It was also suggested that differences in “national” definitions around security mean that EU-level definitions should remain flexible and adaptive (Interviewee C2.13)
 - One interviewee suggested an example of a common understanding of security issues among European security practitioners was the *Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment* (SOCTA) that is published by Europol. This document:

“...gives a very comprehensive overview of the development of criminal trends in Europe... [and] is the guiding document for what we do at European level. It informs our decision-making to a large extent —and it also informs the actions undertaken by Europol. So in terms of the security threats posed by organised crime, there is a joint understanding.”

Interviewee D1.2
 - One interviewee suggested that a common understanding exists at the EU political level. But nationally — and even within member states or regions — there is no common understanding (Interviewee D2.23)
- 5 interviewees did not believe that a common understanding of security issues exists among European security practitioners

“... every country has its own priorities and ways of dealing with crimes.”

Interviewee C1.5
- 1 Interviewee suggested that the existence of a common understanding depended on the type of crime.

5.5 Do you think a European Security Model should consider human and societal factors? If YES: How might it do this, do you think?

Summary of responses

There is consensus on the importance of including human and societal factors within any European Security Model. It was argued that these factors are inherent to security. Indeed, it was suggested that security is about “*looking at the factors... that enable [and] facilitate crime, that drive criminal activity...*”, and about how end-users “*... intervene there, to*

...prevent criminals from becoming criminals at a much earlier stage". Security was considered to be "...embedded within the culture of a state".

- 11 interviewees thought that a European Security Model should consider human and societal factors:

"A European Security Model should definitely use human and societal factors. In general, the role of community involvement in prevention and the need to tackle root causes of delinquency and crime is seen as essential. It is the responsibility of governments at all levels to create, maintain and promote crime prevention."

Interviewee C1.9

"so sometimes you really have to not just consider the regulations, but you really have to step away from the regulations to keep that human area also in in your mind... [you have to be] proactive, yes... [for example] If you see if there is another Civil War not too far away from the European Union, you have to act in advance otherwise you will have the same situation"

Interviewee C1.10

"Yes, definitely. Socio-cultural factors – understanding how security is embedded within the culture of a state and even in a region. Europe is trying to take this into account but finding consensus sometimes difficult for topics that are particularly relevant only for some member states."

Interviewee C2.13

"The security model should be social. There is no security where people are not able to meet their basic needs."

Interviewee D1.22

- One interviewee highlighted the use of societal and situational crime prevention (Interviewee D1.2)
- Furthermore, one interviewee warned against a European Security Model being excessively technology focussed:

"The European Security Model should not fall into the trap of being to technologically based— [just] because this is the stuff that gets funding and is easier built across borders."

Interviewee D1.19

- 1 Interviewee was unsure regarding the term 'human factors', but stated that cultural factors should be taken into account (C2.12).

5.6 Do you think there exists a 'European approach' to security? If YES: Can you talk a little about what you think this 'European approach' is?

Summary of responses

Of those that expressed an opinion regarding this question, 6 interviewees believed that a 'European approach' to security existed, while 4 thought this did not exist.

A number of interviewees believed that there was “*some kind of common outlook*”, and that this supported cooperation and exchange of information to a certain degree.

One interviewee suggested the emergence of a 'European approach' to security was:

“...a process. It starts with securing borders, and it goes on with further goals.”

Another issue that emerged from the interviews was the perception that, when talking about a 'European approach' to security, what was usually meant was “*efficient and acceptable (...) police cooperation*”. Thus, 'European security' was sometimes synonymous with 'policing in Europe' — for example, police exchange and police cooperation.

- 6 interviewees thought that a 'European approach' to security exists, and made reference to a number of what they saw as examples of this:

“The Internal Security Strategy is the main European strategy for the combat against cross border crime in the EU.”

Interviewee C1.5

- 1 interviewee offered as examples various EU initiatives, such as EMPACT and Horizon 2020 research programme (Interviewee C1.10). Another interviewee referred to “*data infrastructures*”, EU agencies, European networks for practitioners and regional forums (Interviewee D1.19)
- Europol was also suggested as an example of a 'European approach', but it was highlighted that it lacked input on social and societal aspects that might make the initiative more culturally 'European' in nature.

“What I do think is that there is a missing exchange, specifically with academia from the social science part, because that is more about the understanding of how society is working, how it is functioning.”

Interviewee C2.15

- According to one interview, where a European approach did exist, it did not go very deep:

“There are approaches to a European security policy, but very little of that makes it into actual practice, and petty crime is barely considered at all.”

Interviewee C2.14

- 4 interviewees did not think a 'European approach' to security exists, but one interviewee conceded there are cross border initiatives (Interviewee C2.13).

5.7 How might a European Security Model support an EU-wide approach to security?

Interviewees suggested a number of ways in which a European Security Model might support improved approaches to security. The included:

- Practical support for end-users

“...Developing tools to assist in the identification of appropriate responses and evaluate their effectiveness; ensuring knowledge about organised criminal groups, illicit market mechanisms and modus operandi of criminal networks; generating knowledge on novel approaches and recent technological developments which may impact on policy-development at EU level.”

Interviewee C1.9

- Providing a common understanding of threats and strategies:

“I think you would benefit from a more common understanding of the threats we face and how to tackle them jointly.”

Interviewee D1.2

“The way forward is learning from each other, building common knowledge, strategies, etc., but the main ground is the willingness to promote and to use new experiences commonly elaborated.”

Interviewee D2.2

- Support on the application of human rights in practice

“One key aspect would be linking it to the human rights agenda and sort of using the rights-based approaches like the guiding principle. (...) I think human rights are not vague principles and would be sort of at the sort of common denominator.”

Interviewee D1.21

- It was emphasised that any model should be appropriate for practical application:

“A European Security Model can support an EU-wide approach to security if it is concrete and applicable.”

Interviewee D2.23.

5.8 What do you think are the common European security approaches that should be implemented by security practitioners?

Interviewees offered a number of examples of European security approaches that could be implemented by security practitioners:

- Crime prevention — especially with regard to effective measures ('what works'):

"Underlying the idea of effective implementation of crime prevention measures is the importance of understanding 'what works' and 'what does not'. In this way parties... do not have to constantly 'reinvent the wheel'... This knowledge base should be disseminated to all... concerned with crime prevention. European experience points up the importance of strong central agencies that can play this role."

Interviewee C1.9

- One interviewee highlighted the need for an increased focus on prevention rather than repression or punishment. They also suggested: *"We need common standards but what those standards mean should be decided at national or local level"* (D1.19)

- One interviewee stressed the importance of communicating information to the local level, as well as the national level. They highlighted networks such as the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) or EMPACT, while stating:

"...It's clearly a challenging aspect — engaging with the local level and making sure that local best practices are replicated, collected and also evaluated."

Interviewee D1.2

5.9 We've talked a bit about 'Europeanness' and security. Our challenge is to redesign a European Security Model. What do you think might be included in such a model; and what should be avoided or left out?

The interviewees offered the following suggestions regarding what might be included in a European Security Model:

- Prevention — particularly relating to petty crime — and feelings of insecurity:

"...Repressive measures are already well-organised, but prevention not quite as much yet. Prevention and victim protection should have received more attention. Petty crime has a great impact and touches on... subjective feelings of security among the population."

Interviewee C2.12

"If we talk about the European Security Model — justice with crime prevention — my impression is that... it's too much focused on repression and too little on prevention. More room for crime prevention — be it societal, be it situational, you know — could improve our overall approach to security."

Interviewee D1.2

- Factors, issues and/or problems that need to be addressed at a European level (Interviewee C2.13).

"We need to think in [terms of] priorities in the EU, or else we get lost in details... If there is a chance to work on crime and subjective security effectively on a European level, we should analyse where that is... possible — and then do it"

Interviewee C.2.13

- Petty crime — including that taking place on the internet:

"Petty crime makes up a large volume of... crime, but hardly plays a role [in EU strategy documents]... It should include education and awareness programs for the public, and it is important to include cyber"

Interviewee C2.14

"There is such a disconnect between the EU and just everyday citizens, and that lack of attention given to everyday crime is widening the gap between citizens and institutions rather than addressing it. By having a security strategy that is removed from everyday life, we're reinforcing that message that the EU is sort of distancing itself from everyday concerns. Which is a shame."

Interviewee D1.21

- Partnership working and information exchange — particularly in relation to prevention:

"To foster exchange European level in between member states and offer some sort of cooperation and mechanism for crime prevention counsellors, crime prevention practitioners that is voluntary"

Interviewee D1.2

"It's important to increase public-private partnerships heavily, especially in terms of surveillance of private spaces (e.g. shopping stores) through private actors, not through the state."

Interviewee C2.14

- Consideration of human rights, 'European values', principles and critical reflection:

"The Guiding principles: Human rights and a strict enforcement of human rights as a condition."

Interviewee D1.21

“A European model should not consist of recipes, but of principles — of a common understanding, taking into account the relevance of context. Reflection and critical thinking should be the basis of it...”

Interviewee D2.2

- Finally, interviewees urged that existing good-practice in community / citizen-centred approaches to security not be forgotten:

“There needs to be... an enormous amount of bridging and remembering rather than redesigning. It is really trying to cherish the achievements of a civilian, community-oriented, responsive, proportionate, provision of security.”

Interviewee D1.19

“Start with the citizens. So, you know, looking at what is actually of interest to EU citizens instead of just looking at what member states are ready to give up as a policy issue in order to share at a European level.”

Interviewee D1.21

Interviewees offered the following suggestions regarding what should be excluded from a European Security Model:

- 1 interviewee emphasised the need to avoid being overly technology-focused

“... We should avoid technology bias...”

Interviewee D1.19

- The same interviewee urged that any model does not focus on particular security threats:

“And [we should be] finding a common language without falling prey to excessive biases on one or another threat in the name of cooperation.”

Interviewee D1.19

- 1 interviewee suggested that civil society should be included within a European Security Model, highlighting that over recent years this group had been excluded from some EU security policy structures and networks

“...Slowly but surely, this sort of innovative approach of including Civil Society practitioners and research has been set aside. Member states have taken over and member states have always been very concerned that the commission doesn't — or that the EU institutions don't — take over [security policy].”

Interviewee D1.21

6 Interview conclusions: Requirements for a European Security Model

While the literature review outlined the case for EU consideration of so-called 'petty crime', the interview research highlighted the difficulties in achieving this. It was pointed out that petty crime was not easy to address at the EU level:

"The petty crime area is a really, really difficult area for international cooperation, and is lacking awareness, training and resources."

Interviewee D1.2

Nevertheless, due to its significant impact on EU citizens, the consensus was that any European Security Model should address petty crime.

In addition, interviews suggest that the European Security Model should focus on prevention — particularly of everyday 'petty' crimes. Indeed, there is a strong case for prevention being a cost effective method for reducing property crime and harm to citizens.

The crime drop that has occurred in all European countries over the last 20 years is best explained by better security measures enshrined in regulations, codes, standards and laws. These relate to products, services, and environments. As an example, the introduction of EU rules making mandatory electronic engine immobilisers on all new cars sold within the European Union, which reduced car theft by an estimated 40%.²⁹ Thus, responsibility for security does not lie exclusively with policing and the criminal justice system (though these are vitally important), but also with the process of making regulations, codes, standards and laws —which may be at the national and/or European level.

The European Security Model should consider human rights, 'European values', principles and critical reflection. One interviewee also highlighted the tension between security and freedom, suggesting that any European Security Model will need to balance the issue of rights and freedoms (such as data protection and the right to privacy) with security goals. The warning of Benjamin Franklin's was raised:

"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."

Benjamin Franklin, 1755

²⁹ van Ours, J. C. and Vollaard, B. (2016) "The Engine Immobiliser: A Non-starter for Car Thieves", *The Economic Journal*. Volume 126, Issue 593. June 2016.

Partnership working and information exchange should be supported by a European Security Model — particularly in relation to prevention. In some areas, cooperation and trust have been established:

“The level of cooperation we have in Europe is... unparalleled and... the trust with which member states cooperate... — that's impressive”

Interviewee D1.2

However, there appears to be a need for more consensus on security, and a European Security Model might provide this.

7 Discussion and conclusion

This section discusses issues arising from the literature review and interviews, and presents key conclusions to inform development of a European Security Model.

7.1 Internal and external security

European security strategy has evolved to become one in which:

"...Internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked"

European Security Strategy, 2003.

The Internal Security Strategy focused initially on perceived *"significant common threats"* like terrorism, serious and organised crime, cross-border crime and violence — later including cybercrime. EU policy documents relating to internal security deal mostly with security threats that relate to international factors (or that have international consequences), while everyday 'petty crime' — notwithstanding its significant impact on citizens — has received less attention. The burden of everyday crime and insecurity on citizens is evidenced in multiple EU reports (for example, FRA, 2021). Furthermore, there is an important gender aspect to both crime and feelings of insecurity, which can have very real consequences for citizens — causing adverse changes in behaviour, avoidance of places and fear of others.

Therefore, a European Security Model must be relevant to everyday crime — so-called 'petty crime' such as violence, harassment, theft, burglary and vandalism — and feelings of insecurity that are a source of harm for millions of EU citizens. As the Council of Europe states, citizens should expect to be:

"...Secure and safe, ... free, as far as possible, from crime, delinquency and aggression."

Council of Europe, 2009.

Despite many solutions to petty crime being local, often at the neighbourhood level, these problems should be addressed, shared and supported within a European Security Model.

7.2 Subsidiarity and proportionality

Two principles of the EU (Lisbon Treaty 2009) are relevant here: subsidiarity and proportionality (see box, below).

What are 'subsidiarity' and 'proportionality' in the EU context?

The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. It aims to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made to verify that action at EU level is justified in light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level.

Specifically, it is the principle whereby the EU does not take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level.

It is closely linked to the principle of proportionality, which requires that any action by the EU should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aims of the Treaties.

Source: Eur-Lex, available [here](#)

Subsidiarity is enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union, and means that decisions — on security or anything else— should be taken as close as possible to the citizen. In the case of everyday, 'petty' crime, this is where offences (and the harm they cause) is situated — at the level of the individual citizen.

Consequently, any European Security Model needs to respect subsidiarity and deal with shared principles and security culture that might be considered European. However, as the Council of Europe suggests that EU citizens should be safe and secure, “...Free, as far as possible, from crime, delinquency and aggression”. It is therefore consistent with the principle of proportionality that everyday, 'petty' crime be at least considered at the EU-level — not prescriptive, but supporting and enabling decisions at the member state or local level.

Concerns over the issue of subsidiarity may explain why European internal security approaches have historically somewhat ignored everyday, 'petty' crime — except when related to organised crime, terrorism, or cross border crime. This may perhaps also be why the related issue of citizens' feelings of insecurity has received less consideration. The need for 'ordinary crime' to be addressed at an EU level has been highlighted in the past. In 2014, the European Forum for Urban Security, a body representing some 250 local and regional authorities within Europe, raised this point in their response to the proposed updated EU Internal Security Strategy:

“Efus members, as representatives of European local and regional authorities throughout Europe, stress the need for the EU to also tackle 'ordinary crime' in line with its ambition of putting citizens at the heart of European policies.”

Efus, 2014

7.3 European values

It is evident from the literature review and the interview responses that there is a clear set of overarching 'European values' that a European Security Model should consider. These include respect for fundamental human rights, the rule of law, transparency, dialogue, equality, accountability, democratic control and public accountability.

In addition, social aspects should be taken into account. This includes social structures and processes, but also the social inequalities that can form the basis for everyday crime. Consequently, a European Security model should demonstrate its connection to the citizen, and be framed in respect to citizens' experience of crime.

7.4 Final conclusions

Since the outset of the CCI project, we have become aware of uncertainty and some confusion in relation to the terminology used in this Task — were we looking for a “strategy” or a “model” (and what was the difference?) — and a certain vagueness in the attempt to elaborate a “European security approach”. In search of clarity, we sought a European Security Model within the mountains of published EU security documents. We detected indications of a European Security Model in the literature; it is mentioned vaguely in the mists of particular policy documents published since the turn of the millennium. But that is all the researchers found — its ‘footprints’. In this way, our search for the European Security Model has resembled the search for the Yeti: a creature that would seem to leave only hints and impressions, but no real evidence.

Interview research indicates that the ‘impression’ that a European Security Model exists is shared by security policymakers and practitioners. However, interviewees also demonstrated some confusion or uncertainty with regard to related EU-level security terminology — is the Internal Security Strategy a European Security Model? Nearly all interviewees felt they had glimpsed the footprints of our Yeti — indeed, a few even suggested they had seen pictures of a security model (or was it a strategy?).

In this report — deliverable 9.1 of the *Cutting Crime Impact* project — we aimed to track down the European Security Model. To capture and cage this strategic security Yeti. Having followed the footprints through the literature and consulted with European security policymakers and practitioners we might conclude that our Yeti, the European Security Model, does not exist. However, we instead choose to conclude that it has simply *not yet been born*. Further, we suggest that our research evidences the need for such a model — that a European Security Model would be a strategic asset that might help address several weaknesses in EU-level security policy while strengthening a shared European conception of what security means for a modern, democratic society. In effect, the CCI research reveals the gap — the footprint — that such a European Security Model might fill and identifies some of its required characteristics. We will seek to define these characteristics through workshops and discussions over the coming months with our CCI consortium and Advisory Board members (DesignLab 5). However, even at this early stage, we can suggest two characteristics.

Firstly, the literature review — our search for the Yeti in EU security documents — revealed the overlap in terminology and imprecision in language used in such policy documents. Strategy at the EU level appears to lack structure, and may be the source of some of the concerns voiced by interviewees regarding the dynamic (and potential tensions) between EU-level security policy, member-state policy and local policy. We suggest, therefore, that an important characteristic of any European Security Model might be that it is **not** a *'strategy'*, but rather that it describes the ethos or civilised culture of European security — what the Greek term *Politismos*. Such a model could provide a useful foundation on which to construct and evolve shared security policies and strategies.

Leading on from this, the second characteristic of a European Security Model emerges from the interview research, which underlined the critical importance (and, in some cases, unfortunate absence) of *clarity*. Consequently, it is essential that any European Security Model developed by the CCI project demonstrates clarity — in its structure; in its purpose; and in its communication.

POLITISMOS (poh-lee-tees-MOHS)

Politismos is the Greek word equivalent to *"culture"*, but which can have as broad a translation as *"civilization"*. A complex term that relates to both 'polis', and 'politeia', meaning *"citizen"* and *"polity"* and contains within it principles of morality and aesthetics.

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9 Appendices

9.1 Appendix 1: CEN standardisation and EU COST Action TU1203

From around the turn of the millennium, a set of crime prevention standards was made and issued by CEN (CEN/TC 325 'Crime prevention through building, facility and area design'). The CEN standards give guidance for situational crime prevention by setting out best practice and guides in the urban or building design. It has so far seven publications in this field. The standardisation deliverables promote best practice for the cooperation of teams consisting of local initiatives and community policing practices, which involve the police forces, local authorities, businesses, associations and citizens.

The standardisation community is closely linked with the project COST TU 1203 (European Cooperation in Science and Technology- Crime Prevention through Urban Design and Planning) where 25 member countries participated. They shared for four years their experiences and proposed a revision of the existing standardisation documents (available [here](#)). This European standardisation work is — and will remain — work in progress also in connection to worldwide standardisation work from ISO on crime prevention (e.g. ISO 22341:2021) and risk management (ISO 31000 series).

9.2 Appendix 2: FRA results, 2021

Some relevant research results from this European survey research are included below:

- Experiences of violence (page 18)

Nearly one in 10 people (9 %) in the EU-27 experienced physical violence in the five years before the survey, and 6 % experienced physical violence in the 12 months before the survey. This corresponds to more than 22 million people experiencing physical violence in one year in the EU-27 countries (an estimate based on the results of the survey relative to the EU's population).

Violence is defined as experiencing one or more of four broad acts of physical violence: (i) a person slapping you, throwing something at you, pushing you or pulling your hair; (ii) hitting you once with a fist or with something else that could hurt you; (iii) kicking or dragging you, or beating you up; or (iv) trying to suffocate or strangle you.

The experiences of violence over the five years before the survey vary by country within the EU, ranging from 3 % to 18 %.

- Experiences of harassment (page 22)

In the EU-27, two in five people (41 %) experienced harassment in the five years before the survey – ranging from offensive and threatening comments in person to offensive and threatening gestures and messages sent online, including through social media. In the 12

months before the survey, 29% experienced harassment. This corresponds to almost 110 million people in the EU-27 experiencing harassment in a year (an estimate based on the results of the survey relative to the EU's population).

Experiences of harassment in the 12 months before the survey range from 46% to 9%, depending on the country.

The most common form of harassment that EU citizens experience involves offensive or threatening comments made in person, experienced by 32% of respondents in the five years before the survey.

- **Burglary** (page 24)

Overall, 8 % of people in the EU-27 experienced a burglary of their home or other property in the five years before the survey. The results also show that 3 % experienced burglary in the 12 months before the survey. Depending on the country, experiences of burglary (in the five years before the survey) range from 14 % to 2 %. Certain groups experience higher rates of burglary than others. These include people who are limited in their usual activities (by a health problem or disability), and people who self-identify as belonging to an ethnic minority.

9.3 Appendix 3: Interview question route

The question route for Task 9.1.2 interviews is structured around the four different groups of interviewees:

- **Group A:** Originators / developers of the European Security Model
- **Group B:** Developers of H2020 funding calls referencing the European Security Model
- **Group C:** Users (and potential users) of the European Security Model
- **Group D:** Contextual and / or policy experts.

9.3.1 Group A: Originators / developers of the European Security Model

SCRIPT: *"As part of the EU-funded project, Cutting Crime Impact (CCI), the project is developing a conceptual framework/ model that integrates high-impact petty crime and associated feelings of insecurity within the European Security Model.*

The purpose of this interview is to understand your thoughts and views on European security strategy — specifically, the European Security Model. I understand that you have been involved in discussions and developments from which the concept of a European Security Model emerged?"

1. What was your role in discussions leading to the development of the European Security Model as a concept within European security strategy?

2. What is the purpose / function of a European Security Model?
 - 2.1 Who was the European Security Model designed to be used by?
3. Do you think the European Security Model has been successful?

PROMPT: *In other words, has it fulfilled its purpose / function?*

 - 3.1 If yes, how?
4. Do you think there exists a common understanding of security issues among European security practitioners?
 - 4.1 **If NO / DON'T KNOW:** Why not?
 - 4.2 **If YES:** What do you think this common understanding includes?
5. Do you think a European Security Model should consider human and societal factors?
 - 5.1 **If NO:** Why not?
 - 5.2 **If YES:** How might it do this?
6. Do you think there exists a 'European approach' to security?
 - 6.1 **If YES:** Can you talk a little about what you think this 'European approach' is?
7. How might a European Security Model support an EU-wide approach to security?

PROMPT: Integrating prevention, investigation and mitigation capabilities
8. What do you think are the common European security approaches that should be implemented by security practitioners?

PROMPT: Such as: enhancing prevention and anticipation; or the timely involvement of all relevant stakeholders with a role in protection.
9. We've talked a bit about 'Europeanness' and security. Our challenge is to redesign a European Security Model...

What do you think might be included in such a model; and what should be avoided or left out?
10. Is there anything else you'd like to add, relating to any of the issues we've discussed today?

SCRIPT: *“Thank you very much for your time today and answering my questions. Please feel free to get in touch if you have any further thoughts on what we've discussed today.*

We'd be happy to provide you with a copy of the research report when it is published.

The findings of this research will be used by the CCI project to support concept generation,

design and development of an expanded European Security Model that will be presented at the CCI Final Conference on 1st and 2nd of December this year. If you are interested in attending, please save the date and we will send you an invitation nearer the time.

Thank you."

9.3.2 **Group B: Developers of H2020 funding calls referencing the European Security Model**

SCRIPT: *"As part of the EU-funded project, Cutting Crime Impact (CCI), the project is developing a conceptual framework/ model that integrates high-impact petty crime and associated feelings of insecurity within the European Security Model.*

The purpose of this interview is to understand your thoughts and views on European security strategy — specifically, the European Security Model. I understand that you have been involved in the EU Horizon 2020 funding programme, some of which funding calls reference the concept of a European Security Model"

1. Have you heard of the European Security Model?

1.1 If so, what do you think it is?

PROMPT: If one or more documents are referenced, ensure full references are recorded.

2. Do you think it is / would be useful to have a European Security Model?

2.1 If **NO**: Why not?

2.2 If **YES**: How would it be useful, do you think?

3. Who do you think the users of a European Security Model might be?

PROMPT: EU policymakers; National policymakers; LEAs; other security practitioners

4. Do you think there exists a common understanding of security issues among European security practitioners?

4.1 If **NO / DON'T KNOW**: Why not?

4.2 If **YES**: What do you think is included within this common understanding?

5. Do you think a European Security Model should consider human and societal factors?

5.1 If **NO**: Why not?

5.2 If **YES**: How might it do this, do you think?

6. Do you think there exists a 'European approach' to security?

6.1 If **YES**: Can you talk a little about what you think this 'European approach' is?

7. How might a European Security Model support an EU-wide approach to security?

PROMPT: Integrating prevention, investigation and mitigation capabilities

8. What do you think are the common European security approaches that should be implemented by security practitioners?

PROMPT: Such as: enhancing prevention and anticipation; or the timely involvement of all relevant stakeholders with a role in protection.

9. We've talked a bit about 'Europeanness' and security. Our challenge is to redesign a European Security Model...

What do you think might be included in such a model; and what should be avoided or left out?

10. Is there anything else you'd like to add, relating to any of the issues we've discussed today?

SCRIPT: *"Thank you very much for your time today and answering my questions. Please feel free to get in touch if you have any further thoughts on what we've discussed today.*

We'd be happy to provide you with a copy of the research report when it is published.

The findings of this research will be used by the CCI project to support concept generation, design and development of an expanded European Security Model that will be presented at the CCI Final Conference on 1st and 2nd of December this year. If you are interested in attending, please save the date and we will send you an invitation nearer the time.

Thank you."

9.3.3 **Group C: Users (and potential users) of the European Security Model**

SCRIPT: *"As part of the EU-funded project, Cutting Crime Impact (CCI), the project is developing a conceptual framework/ model that integrates high-impact petty crime and associated feelings of insecurity within the European Security Model.*

The purpose of this interview is to understand your thoughts and views on European security strategy — specifically, the European Security Model. We believe that you may be a potential user of an improved European Security Model."

1. Have you heard of the European Security Model?

1.1 If so, what do you think it is?

NOTE: If one or more documents are referenced, ensure full references are recorded.

2. Do you think it is / would be useful to have a European Security Model?

2.1 **If NO:** Why not?

2.2 If YES: How would it be useful, do you think?

3. Who do you think the users of a European Security Model might be?

PROMPT: EU policymakers; National policymakers; LEAs; other security practitioners

4. Do you think there exists a common understanding of security issues among European security practitioners?

4.1 If NO / DON'T KNOW: Why not?

4.2 If YES: What do you think is included within this common understanding?

5. Do you think a European Security Model should consider human and societal factors?

5.1 If NO: Why not?

5.2 If YES: How might it do this, do you think?

6. Do you think there exists a 'European approach' to security?

6.1 If YES: Can you talk a little about what you think this 'European approach' is?

7. How might a European Security Model support an EU-wide approach to security?

PROMPT: Integrating prevention, investigation and mitigation capabilities

8. What do you think are the common European security approaches that should be implemented by security practitioners?

PROMPT: Such as: enhancing prevention and anticipation; or the timely involvement of all relevant stakeholders with a role in protection.

9. We've talked a bit about 'Europeanness' and security. Our challenge is to redesign a European Security Model...

What do you think might be included in such a model; and what should be avoided or left out?

10. Is there anything else you'd like to add, relating to any of the issues we've discussed today?

SCRIPT: *"Thank you very much for your time today and answering my questions. Please feel free to get in touch if you have any further thoughts on what we've discussed today.*

We'd be happy to provide you with a copy of the research report when it is published.

The findings of this research will be used by the CCI project to support concept generation, design and development of an expanded European Security Model that will be presented at

the CCI Final Conference on 1st and 2nd of December this year. If you are interested in attending, please save the date and we will send you an invitation nearer the time.

Thank you."

9.3.4 **Group D: Contextual and / or policy experts**

SCRIPT: *"As part of the EU-funded project, Cutting Crime Impact (CCI), the project is developing a conceptual framework/ model that integrates high-impact petty crime and associated feelings of insecurity within the European Security Model.*

The purpose of this interview is to draw on your expertise in security policy and practice at a national / European level, and capture your thoughts and views on European security strategy — specifically, the European Security Model."

1. Have you heard of the European Security Model?

1.2 If so, what do you think it is?

NOTE: If one or more documents are referenced, ensure full references are recorded.

2. Do you think it is / would be useful to have a European Security Model?

2.1 **If NO:** Why not?

2.2 **If YES:** How would it be useful, do you think?

3. Who do you think the users of a European Security Model might be?

PROMPT: EU policymakers; National policymakers; LEAs; other security practitioners

4. Do you think there exists a common understanding of security issues among European security practitioners?

4.1 **If NO / DON'T KNOW:** Do you think there should be such a common understanding?

PROMPT: Why? / Why not?

4.2 **If YES:** What do you think is included within this common understanding?

5. Do you think a European Security Model should consider human and societal factors?

5.1 **If NO:** Why not?

5.2 **If YES:** How might it do this, do you think?

6. Do you think there exists a 'European approach' to security?

6.1 **If YES:** Can you talk a little about what you think this 'European approach' is?

7. How might a European Security Model support an EU-wide approach to security?

PROMPT: Integrating prevention, investigation and mitigation capabilities

8. What do you think are the common European security approaches that should be implemented by security practitioners?

PROMPT: Such as: enhancing prevention and anticipation; or the timely involvement of all relevant stakeholders with a role in protection.

9. We've talked a bit about 'Europeanness' and security. Our challenge is to redesign a European Security Model...

What do you think might be included in such a model; and what should be avoided or left out?

10. Is there anything else you'd like to add, relating to any of the issues we've discussed today?

SCRIPT: *"Thank you very much for your time today and answering my questions. Please feel free to get in touch if you have any further thoughts on what we've discussed today.*

We'd be happy to provide you with a copy of the research report when it is published.

The findings of this research will be used by the CCI project to support concept generation, design and development of an expanded European Security Model that will be presented at the CCI Final Conference on 1st and 2nd of December this year. If you are interested in attending, please save the date and we will send you an invitation nearer the time.

Thank you."



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